In 1967, 2,500 Viet Cong Attacked 450 US Soldiers. It Was A HUGE Mistake.

By 0825 on the morning of March 21st, 1967, fire support base gold was being overrun.

Three sides of the perimeter had been breached.

B Company’s first platoon was destroyed.

2,500 Vietkong of the 272nd regiment were inside the wire against 450 Americans of the Third Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division.

14 of 17 howitzers were damaged.

The Vietkong had captured a quad 50 mount and were swinging it toward the defenderS.

4 hours later, 647 Vietkong lay dead on the field.

31 Americans were killed, a ratio better than 20 to1, earned by men who were losing when the artillery commander ordered his guns depressed to zero elevation, and fired 320,000 steel fletchettes into the assault at chest heighT.

The last time he’d received orders under fire like that, he was getting his battlefield commission at Anzio.

The clearing near Sway wasn’t chosen because it was safe.

It was chosen because Operation Junction City needed fire support bases inside war zone C.

And this elliptical dry rice patty 300 meters by 400 meters ringed by defoliant scarred jungle in Tenin province was flat enough to land helicopters and wide enough to ring with howitzerS.

It was also 3 kilometers from the site of the battle of Achadau fought just four months earlier.

The Vietkong knew this ground intimately.

They had been watching it for monthS.

The Americans found out how well on 19 March when the first helicopters came in.

The Vietkong had pre-rigged the landing zone with five command detonated chargeS.

They blew them as the lifts touched down.

Three Hueies were destroyed.

Six were damaged.

15 Americans were killed before fire support base gold even existed.

Sappers had salted the clearing with 19 unfired 82mm mortar rounds and two 175mm rockets wired for remote detonation.

This was not a position the enemy had overlooked.

This was a position the enemy had prepared.

Colonel Marshall Bgarth, commanding the third brigade, fourth infantry division knew iT.

On the afternoon of 20 March, the day before the attack, he personally observed 30 to 35 Vietkong moving 2,000 m southwest of Gold and called artillery on them.

It was the last warning anyone would geT.

The firebase that morning held 450 men, two infantry companies of the third battalion, 22nd infantry, and three batteries of the second battalion, 77th field artillery with 17 howitzerS.

The man commanding those guns was a 44year-old Lieutenant Colonel who had been fighting wars since he was 16 years old.

His decisions in the next four hours would decide whether anyone walked out of that clearing alive.

In 1939, a 16-year-old named John William Vessie Jr.

Walked into a Minnesota National Guard Armory and lied about his age.

He enlisted as a private, a motorcycle rider in the 59th Field Artillery Brigade, 34th Infantry Division.

By 1942, he was a battery first sergeant in North AfricA.

He later said it was the toughest job he ever held.

On the 6th of May 1944, pinned down on the Anzio beach head with his battery taking heavy casualties, the 21-year-old first sergeant received a battlefield commission to second lieutenanT.

Enlisted man one morning, officer by afternoon, under fire both timeS.

He spent the rest of the Italian campaign as a forward observer, calling in the same guns he would command 23 years later in Vietnam.

By the time Vessie retired, he would hold the highest military rank any American can achieve.

That story is coming.

But on the morning of March 21st, 1967, he was a lieutenant colonel with 17 damaged howitzers and a weapon most infantry men had never seen fired.

The M546 Aper T, the Beehive round.

Each shell contained 8,000 finabilized steel fletchetteS.

1-inch hardened steel darts with crucifform fins were packed inside a 105mm artillery shell around a small expelling charge.

A howitzer is designed to fire in an arc.

Shells go up, come down, and explode on a target miles away.

Vessie’s crews would fire these flaT.

They fired with the barrel leveled to near zero elevation.

The fuse set for muzzle action.

8,000 fletchettes exited the tube at supersonic velocity in an expanding cone aimed at chest height into men less than 75 meters away.

At that speed, the darts went through bone through multiple bodies in line.

A cannon turned into the largest shotgun ever builT.

That is not how artillery is supposed to work.

That is what desperation looks like.

At 0630 on March 21st, the forest around fire support base gold detonated.

Between 500 and 650 mortar rounds hit the perimeter in the opening minuteS.

60 millimeter and 82 millimeter rounds walked across the gunpits and fighting positionS.

14 of 17 howitzers were damaged by fragmentS.

Recoilous rifles and RPG2 rockets joined from the woodline.

Then the blackclad infantry came out of the treeS.

Captain Walt Sugar, commanding B Company, 322nd Infantry, watched his first platoon position take the first wave from the southeaSt.

The wire was breached in minuteS.

Hand-to-h hand fighting erupted in the foxholeS.

By 0711, the platoon was gone.

Overrun.

The northeastern perimeter fell by 0813.

The northern perimeter was breached by 0825.

At the northern line, the VC captured an M45 quad mount, 450 caliber barrels on a single mount, and began swinging it toward the defenderS.

A 105mm howitzer 75 m away fired a single round into the gun and the men trying to turn iT.

The weapon and crew ceased to exiSt.

B Company pulled back to a tighter secondary perimeter ringing the artillery.

VC were inside the wire on three sides within 5 mters of the battalion aid station within hand grenade range of the command poSt.

Vessie was already moving through the shattered gun line under mortar fire.

He organized repair crews on 14 damaged howitzerS.

He shifted artillery men forward to plug gaps in the infantry line where entire squads had been killed or pulled back.

He took a wound and he kept moving.

When he spotted VC rocket teams methodically working their way down his battery, destroying guns one by one, he picked up an M79 grenade launcher, moved into the open with no cover, and personally knocked out three rocket positionS.

Then he gave the order.

All surviving howitzers depressed to zero elevation.

Fuses set for muzzle action.

The crews fired beehive rounds point blank into the assaulT.

40 rounds, 8,000 fletchettes per round.

320,000 steel darts into masked infantry crossing open ground at less than 75 m.

The geometry was simple and the geometry was lethal.

The Vietkong had closed a killing distance for grenades and satchel chargeS.

They had also closed a killing distance for the largest shotgun blast ever fired in combaT.

An artillery piece firing in an arc can miss by hundreds of meterS.

An artillery piece firing flat at chest height into a human wave.

That is a different kind of mathematicS.

The advancing wave stopped.

They did not stop because they chose to.

They stopped because the men in front of them were no longer standing.

When the beehive supply was exhausted, the crew switched to high explosive rounds in direct lay and kept firing.

2,200 rounds from the 277th artillery alone.

Air strikes came.

F4 Phantoms dropping NAPOM within 50 meters of friendly positionS.

Then at 0900, the tree line on the western edge of gold erupted, not with enemy fire, but with the lead elements of the 212th infantry, who had marched through the jungle toward the sound.

Bill Kamo, a radio telephone operator with a company 212th Infantry was with them.

He said later, “I was overwhelmed by the noise that was emanating from the battle site.

No compass was needed to get to the fight 2 km away.

I thought to myself, wow, imagine what it was like on D-Day.”

Minutes later, M113 armored personnel carriers of the 22nd Infantry punched through the southern woodline.

Behind them came the M48 tanks of the 234th Armor.

Their 90mm guns firing canister into the retreating Vietkong.

Colonel G, circling overhead in a bubble helicopter, spotted a Vietkong ambush platoon positioned along the trail the relief column had been about to take and rerouted them before they walked into iT.

Then he killed the ambush with gunshipS.

By 0930, the original perimeter was resecured.

By 10:15, the 272nd regiment was in full disorderly withdrawal.

The 272nd had rehearsed the attack.

Captured documents proved meticulous planning, coordinated infantry assaults from three directions, a mortar bombardment to suppress the howitzers, and an ambush positioned to destroy the American relief column.

They expected to overrun gold the way they had overrun ARVN positionS.

No survivors, quick and total.

They had tried the same playbook 11 days earlier at fire support base 2 at Pre clock.

Same regiment, same tactics and lost 197 dead while three Americans were killed.

They attacked gold anyway.

After Soy Tree, the 272nd was rebuilt, but increasingly with North Vietnamese Army regulars rather than Southern Vietkong volunteerS.

The unit that attacked gold was a southern main force regimenT.

The unit that emerged from the rebuilding was something else.

North Vietnamese army in all but name.

Vietkong prisoners and veterans later confirmed that the beehive produced a particular dread that outstripped its actual casualty counT.

Mass troops in the open could not be ordered through the cone of flesheS.

After the first volleys, they simply would not go forward.

But the honest math matters, too.

The perimeter was substantially overrun on three sideS.

B Company’s first platoon was destroyed.

The position was saved by the inner artillery perimeter, the beehive, and the relief column.

And any one of those could have failed.

The relief was minutes from walking into a prepared ambush.

The mechanized column was blocked at the unfortable soy Samat River and Junction City itself never found COSVN.

The communist headquarters escaped to CambodiA.

So Trey was a tactical victory inside an operationally inconclusive campaign.

The Vietkong came back.

They always came back.

647 Vietkong bodies lay on the field.

31 Americans dead.

A kill ratio better than 20 to1 earned in 4 hourS.

by 450 men who were being overrun when the guns went flaT.

After Vietnam, Vessie kept climbing.

He became brigadier general, then major general, commanding the fourth infantry division, the same division he had fought with at Suy Trey.

He rose to Lieutenant General, then four stars as a general and became commander of United States Forces KoreA.

On the 18th of June 1982, the kid who had lied about his age in a Minneapolis armory became the 10th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the last World War II combat veteran to hold the position.

That is a fact that will never again be true of any American.

The men who survived Soy Trey remember the noise.

They remember the arithmetic.

14 of 17 guns hit, all but three repaired under fire.

They remember the smell of the burials afterward and the bulldozers working while West Morland’s helicopter landed.

They remember the infusion program.

Survivors scattered to other units within days before they could process what they had lived through.

Many learned about the presidential unit citation only years later.

Reagan at Vessie’s retirement said it plainly.

Jack Vessie never forgot what it was like to be just a GI.

He never did.

From a motorcycle rider in Minnesota to the man who leveled the guns at Sway Trey to the highest ranking officer in the United States military, he never forgo.